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Introduction 
This paper presents a history-based perspective on the present controversy surrounding US 
financial assistance to Colombia through a discussion on how the US government 
implemented its Colombian aid programme during the Alliance for Progress (AFP) initiative 
of the 1960’s. The study adds to previous accounts on the political and economic history of 
Colombia in that period, mainly through the description and analysis of recently declassified 
US government documents1. It presents a case study that seems to confirm theoretical 
assumptions on the difficulties of imposing conditionality measures on aid recipient 
countries. Finally, it presents some elements of comparison between the AFP and the present 
US aid initiative known as Plan Colombia. 
 
The general premise of the study is that previous attempts at stabilising beleaguered 
Colombian state organisations through large foreign aid packages left largely unsatisfactory 
results. The Colombian experience with the AFP reveals many of the shortfalls of a counter-
insurgency strategy based primarily on the promise of large-scale US aid, and suggests some 
of the difficulties to be faced in the future by a strategy of institutional strengthening based on 
Plan Colombia.  
 
Theoretical framework 
Economic assistance programmes aimed at developing countries are often subject to criticism 
stemming from the alleged propensity of recipient countries to give less than optimal uses to 
these resources. Faguet, for example, has reviewed empirical evidence showing how aid to 
developing countries tends to be directed towards increasing internal consumption 
(particularly in politically powerful groups) instead of being used for investment that would 
improve the economic future of recipient countries.2 
 
The existing literature on economic aid to developing countries also expresses doubts on the 
capacity of donors to induce particular economic policy choices by recipient governments 
based on the promise of future cooperation, or on the threat of cutting off such cooperation in 
the future.  For instance, multilateral organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank have 
often tried to impose conditionality on structural adjustment loans to induce fiscal orthodoxy 
or market oriented reforms in recipient countries. Authors such as Collier have shown the 
limited success of these conditionality policies in developing countries.3 
                                                 
1 The relative absence of freely available equivalent Colombian government documents will inevitably make 
this paper much more a reflection of the US viewpoint. An account of the official Colombian government 
perspective on this issue is a task that remains to be done.  
2 Jean-Paul Faguet, ‘Multilateral Aid, Politics and Poverty: Past Failures and Future Challenges’, chapter 2 with 
Peter Boone in R. Grant & J. Nijman (Eds.), The Global Crisis in Foreign Aid, Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1998.  
3 Paul Collier, ‘The failure of conditionality’ in Catherine Gwin & Joan Nelson (eds), Perspectives on aid and 
Development. Washington: ODC, 1997.  
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Attempts to influence recipient country choices on political issues through aid are equally, if 
not more controversial. As Nelson has noted, “US policymakers are generally reluctant to 
‘politicize’ these (multilateral) economic institutions with issues such as human rights”. 4 It is 
more often in the realm of bilateral aid where economic aid is forwarded with the explicit 
purpose of attaining political purposes. Post Cold-War interventions by the international 
community in unstable countries have often taken the form of establishing economic aid 
programmes to countries that need help or enticement to undertake and consolidate political 
objectives such as strengthening democratic institutions and organisations, or protecting them 
from collapse (e.g. due to insurgencies by non-democratic actors). However, the effectiveness 
of these policies is often subject to debate. Nelson has said: 
…participation and democracy have much more inclusive, complex and diffuse 
goals than human rights or improved economic governance. Participation, 
competitive politics and representative governments can take a multitude of 
forms. The institutions and procedures that work well in one country may work 
very poorly in another. The risks of setting in motion (through foreign aid) 
seriously harmfully dynamics are considerably greater with respect to 
participation and multiparty democracy than with respect to basic human rights 
and economic governance.5 
 
Moreover, the donor’s preference for obtaining certain political improvements in recipient 
countries may change over time, due to reasons arising from the former’s self- interest. For 
example, Putzel has discussed the alleged change in US support for land reform in the 
Philippines in the early 1960’s. Security and economic considerations would have led US 
policy there to shift from promoting equity by supporting land redistribution, to privileging 
agricultural productivity even at the cost of continuing inequality. 6 The previous arguments 
highlight the dangers of expecting institutional strengthening, democratisation, or other 
political aims to be achieved in developing countries through foreign aid programmes.  
 
The case of the Alliance For Progress 
The AFP provides a strong case for many of the previously stated claims concerning the 
difficulties faced by economic aid programmes in developing countries, particularly those 
that use aid to obtain political objectives. When launched by US president John F. Kennedy 
in 1961, the Alliance sought to encourage the adoption of anti-poverty policies that would 
increase the legitimacy of Latin American governments and thus prevent Communist 
revolution. 7 Still, most of the literature concludes today that the AFP was a serious failure of 
US foreign policy, which raised, but could not fulfil, great expectations of material 
improvement, democracy and stability in Latin America.8 
                                                 
4 Joan Nelson & Stephanie Eglinton, Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid?, Washington: 
ODC, 1992. 
5 Nelson & Eglinton (1992). 
6 James Putzel, A Captive land, The Politics of agrarian reform in the Philippines, London: Catholic Institute for 
International Relations, 1992. 
7 For discussions on Kennedy´s presidency and its early Latin American foreign policy, see Schlesinger, A 
Thousand days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, London: Deutsch, 1965, p. 196. For a more general view 
on the administration´s Latin American policy see Stephen Rabe, The most dangerous area in the World: JFK 
confronts Communist revolution in Latin America, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.  
8 Among other accounts, see Jerome Levinson & Juan de Onis, The Alliance that lost its way, New York: 
Twentieth century Fund, 1970;  Simon Hanson, Dollar Diplomacy modern style, Washington: Interamerican 
Affairs Press, 1970; Harvey Perloff, The Alliance for Progress: a social invention in the making, Baltimore: 
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The Alliance’s origin has to do with ideas on development economics defended by influential 
US academics such as Walt Rostow, along with political circumstances in Latin America and 
the US arising from the Cuban Revolution. On the first point, Rostow had espoused his 
influential theory of modernization in academic circles throughout the 1950’s.9 As an 
economic historian, he argued that all countries experienced a largely predetermined series of 
stages of economic development, in which traditional political and economic structures based 
on the primitive rural world were gradually surpassed.10 Rostow insisted that once a country 
had reached certain social, political and economic preconditions, it would ‘take off’ and 
experience rapid economic growth of the type that had led to industrialisation in Western 
Europe and North America. A pro-Western consumer middle class would emerge in these 
countries as a bulwark of stability against revolution.  
 
Rostow and his fellow modernization theorists argued that, in the face of increasing 
Communist expansion in the Third World, it would be in the interest of the US government to 
provide aid to certain developing countries already in possession of adequate socio-economic 
preconditions. US aid would act as a catalyst for ‘takeoff’, generating modern economic 
growth and political stability while denying Communism fertile ground for new takeovers.11 
After the Cuban revolution, US presidential candidate John F. Kennedy became convinced 
that Rostow’s ideas were particularly applicable to Latin America, which showed some of the 
characteristics described by modernization theorists as “preconditions” for takeoff.12 After 
Kennedy’s election in 1960, Rostow joined the administration as assistant to National 
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. A few months later, in March 1961, Kennedy announced 
the Alliance for Progress as a plan to stave off Communist insurrection in the hemisphere by 
promoting economic growth through US aid. The plan called for $20 billion of external funds 
to be invested in the hemisphere in the next decade, including private funds and US public 
assistance resources.13 The Punta del Este Charter of 17 August 1961, which formally 
launched the Alliance, established that, in exchange for US funds, Latin American countries 
committed themselves to promoting internal social reform through measures such as land and 
tax reform and greater spending in health and education14. Latin American governments, 
which for years had been calling for US aid to match the generosity shown to Europe in the 
Marshall Plan, reacted enthusiastically to the proposal.15 Generalized optimism led some to 
predict that the continent would not only avoid Communist insurrection, but would eradicate 
widespread poverty by the end of the decade. In 1962, Teodoro Moscoso, US coordinator for 
the Alliance, proclaimed that “within a decade the direction and results of centuries of Latin 
                                                                                                                                                        
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969; Ronald Scheman, ‘Alliance for progress, concept and creativity’, in 
Scheman (ed.), Alliance for Progress, a retrospective, London: Praeger, 1989; Herbert May, Problems and 
perspectives of the Alliance for Progress, New York: Prager,1968; Rabe (1999); William Rogers, The twilight 
struggle: the Alliance for Progress and the Politics of development in Latin America, New York: Random 
House, 1967. 
9 For accounts on Rostow’s influence on the Alliance, see Kimber Charles Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy and the 
Rhetoric of Foreign Aid, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001; and  Michael Latham, 
Modernisation as ideology: American social science and nation-building in the Kennedy era , Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 
10 See Walt Rostow, The Stages of economic growth, a non-communist manifesto, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991. 
11 Latham (2000), p. 2. 
12 Latham (2000), p. 69. 
13 Levinson & De Onis (1970), p. 326. 
14 Levinson & De Onis (1970), p. 327. 
15 Back in 1958, Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek had called for an “Operation Panamerica” of US aid 
along the lines of the Marshall Plan. Levinson & De Onis (1970), p. 55. 
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American history are to be changed”. 16 While Communism in Latin America did not spread 
beyond Cuba in the 1960s,17 the Alliance fell far short of its social reform targets. It was 
disbanded at the end of the decade amidst mutual disappointment and recrimination between 
the US and recipient countries.18 The following lines of argument are found among the 
reasons often given by historical accounts to explain its failure: 
 
· Lack of internal political will: Latin American elites were opposed to reforms 
that infringed on their secular privileges, such as land redistribution. They sabotaged 
implementation of Alliance programmes in their countries.19 
· Early termination of the J.F.K. presidency: his assassination removed the most 
convinced, idealistic and charismatic proponent of the Alliance in the United States. 
Lyndon B. Johnson did not share his enthusiasm for utopian social reform, fearing it 
would bring instability to Latin America. Instead, he adopted a pragmatic policy of 
supporting pro-US regimes regardless of their social policy or democratic 
inclinations.20 
· The advent of the Vietnam War: rising challenges in Indochina siphoned away 
US political attention and funds, relegating Latin America to its traditional status as a 
low priority in American foreign policy. 21 
· Administrative difficulties: in spite of good intentions, the Alliance was faced 
with the shortcomings of both US and Latin American governments in devising and 
managing development projects. Lack of technical expertise in Latin America, 
combined with turf wars between US agencies and between the US Executive and 
Congress, impaired the effectiveness of the Alliance.22 
· The magnitude of underdevelopment in Latin America: US planners may have 
underestimated the task in hand. While the successful Marshall Plan only required the 
                                                 
16 Quoted in Mark Gilderhus., The second century; US –Latin American Relations since 1889, Wilmington. 
Del.: Scolarly Resources, 2000, p.173. 
17 Rabe (1999), p. 197, has claimed that if Kennedy had lived to know that communism did not advance further 
than Cuba, he would have thought he “seemingly won a major cold war battle in what he considered the most 
dangerous area of the world”. 
18 Levinson & De Onis (1970), p. 286, states that “by the end of the 1960s, US policy in Latin America had 
practically abandoned the original principle of the Alliance” (translation by the author). 
19 For example, Gilderhus (2000), p. 173. 
20 See, for example, Schlesinger, ‘Myth and Reality’ in Scheman (ed.) (1989), p. 83,who claimed: “The Alliance 
was never really tried.  It lasted about a thousand days, not a sufficient test, and thereafter only the name 
remained”. Others, such as Gilderhus (2000), share the opinion that L.B.J. focussed more on stability than 
reform. Robert Dallek  (Flawed giant: LBJ and his times, 1961-1973, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 
p.92) claims that the shift to the right had begun late in Kennedy’s administration. However he agrees that 
L.B.J.’s appointment of conservative Tom Mann as his main Latin American advisor is proof of his “impulse to 
make the Alliance less a vehicle for advancing democracy than a means for promoting private investment and 
backing anti-communism”. On the other hand, Cohen and Tucker (Warren Cohen & Nancy Tucker, Lyndon 
Johnson Confronts the world. American Foreign Policy 1963-1968. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994, p.241) insist that had he lived, Kennedy would have followed many of the same Latin American policies 
adopted eventually by L.B.J. 
21 For example, see Joseph Tulchin, ‘US and Latin America in the 1960s’, Journal of Latin American Studies 
and World Affairs, 30, spring 1988 p.2. 
22 See Rogers (1967), pp. 230-237 for a description of the bureaucratic warfare between the Executive and 
Congress over Alliance appropriations, and its negative impact on the program. Paul Hammond (LBJ and the 
presidential management of foreign relations, Austin , 1992 p.2) described turf wars between Kennedy´s top 
Latin America aides. 
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re-establishment of damaged infrastructure in Europe, the Alliance was unrealistically 
expected to deal with centuries of backwardness and poverty in just a decade.23 
 
Both case studies and general surveys of the Alliance in Latin America tend to conclude that 
the causes for its failure lie in a combination of the above factors. Sections two and three will 
examine primary sources (mainly declassified US government documents) to test how these 
hypotheses apply to the case of Colombia.24 
 
“The showcase of the Alliance”: US aid to Colombia under the Kennedy administration 
Since the first days of his administration, Colombia was seen as one of the most important 
testing fields for Kennedy’s Latin American policy. 25 It had even emerged very briefly as a 
campaign issue in the 1960 US presidential election. During the televised Nixon-Kennedy 
debate of October 21,1960, Kennedy stated “the big struggle will be to prevent the influence 
of Castro to other countries – Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, Colombia”. 26 Colombia’s 
protagonism in the early days of the Alliance had a lot to do with the figure of then president 
Alberto Lleras Camargo. He was one of the key promoters of the National Front, a coalition 
between Colombia’s two traditional parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, who worked 
together to help bring an end in 1957 to the regime of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, a military 
dictator somewhat reminiscent of Argentina’s Peron. 27 After Rojas stepped down, Liberals 
and Conservatives under the National Front reached a power sharing arrangement that was to 
last for 16 years. Lleras Camargo was elected as the National Front’s first presidential 
candidate in 1958, and became president just months before the Cuban revolution brought 
worldwide attention to the continent. Lleras Camargo, along with other Latin reformers such 
as Venezuelan president Romulo Betancourt, and Chile’s Eduardo Frei, was seen by Kennedy 
administration officials as the kind of leader who could offer an alternative to Castroite 
radicalism.28 Lleras Camargo was committed to social reform, and at the same time strongly 
anti-communist and pro-US.  A position paper prepared for Kennedy by the State Department 
on the occasion of his visit to Bogotá in December 1961, stated that “Lleras’s career has been 
noteworthy for unselfish idealism, sincere but non-chauvinistic patriotism and personal 
                                                 
23 See Gilderhus (2000), p. 173 . 
24 Among the few books written on the impact of the Alliance on Colombia, are Otto Morales Benitez, Alianza 
para el Progreso y Reforma Agraria, Bogotá, 1963, which traced the influence of the Alliance for Progress in 
the design of Agrarian Reform strategies in Colombia, while Hernando Agudelo Villa, La Alianza para el 
Progreso, esperanza y frustracion, Bogotá, 1966 attempted the first overall evaluation of the Alliance for 
Progress. The best account of the Colombian experience with the Alliance is found in U. S. Senate, ‘Colombia – 
a case study of US aid. Part I. Study by the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations’, in Survey of the 
Alliance for Progress, Compilation of studies and hearings of the Subcommittee on the American Republics 
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. 29April 1969, Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1969.  
25 A memo sent by Walt Rostow to Kennedy on 2 March 1961, suggested that Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela and 
Argentina could be the first countries to be “weaned off the international dole” by a US led “Big Push”. Quoted 
in Latham (2000), p. 69. 
26 “Face to Face, Nixon-Kennedy”. Vice President Richard Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy, Fourth Joint-
Television – Radio Broadcast, Friday, 21October 1960. Originating ABC, New York, N.Y. All Networks 
Carried. Moderator: Quincy Howe, ABC: Text, format and style are as published in Freedom of 
Communications: Final Report of the Committee on Commerce. United States Senate…, Part III: The Joint 
Appearances of Senator John F. Kennedy and Vicepresident Richard M. Nixon and other 1960 Campaign 
presentations. 87th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report No. 994, Part 3. Washington: US government Printing 
Office, 1961. 
27 See Lars Schoultz, ‘Urbanization and changing voting patterns in Colombia 1946-1970’, Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol 87 issue 1 (march 1972), p.34.  
28 Tony Smith, America´s mission: The US and the world wide struggle for Democracy  in the 20th century, 
Princeton, 1994, p.220. 
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courage in times of crisis”. The same paper recommended Kennedy to express US gratitude 
for “the helpful initiative Colombia has taken on the Cuban problem in the Organization of 
American States.”29 
 
Kennedy’s decision to visit Colombia in December 1961 provided a strong symbol of the 
early hopes placed on the Alliance. In the days before Kennedy’s arrival, his Press Secretary 
Pierre Salinger told the Colombian press that the country had been chosen for this first Latin 
American visit because of its success in undertaking economic and social plans along the 
lines proposed by the Alliance.30 In spite of Kennedy’s worldwide popularity, American 
officials were not ent irely confident of the kind of reception he would receive in Colombia, 
and in the weeks before Kennedy’s arrival, the US embassy in Bogotá was engaged in the 
prevention of anti-American demonstrations. A State Department telegram instructed its 
delegation in Bogotá to contact the Lleras government and ask them to engage in the “quiet 
rounding up of [the] most dangerous agitators…” Lleras should also “make quiet 
representations to those in control of the mass media to encourage them to build up a 
favorable climate for Kennedy’s visit” and appeals should be made “to contacts in the 
Catholic Church for support”. The telegram concluded stating that Lleras should “in addition 
to organizing demonstrations of friendship, deploy loyal members of his party among on-
lookers to augment uniform security forces in suppressing hostile demonstrations.”31 
 
The US embassy’s worries proved largely unfounded. John and Jackie Kennedy spent a day 
in Bogotá in December 1961, participating in the groundbreaking ceremony for Ciudad 
Techo, a large public housing scheme that would become one of the most visible projects of 
the Alliance in Colombia and Latin America. They were welcomed by very large and 
sympathetic crowds, estimated by Press Secretary Pierre Salinger at one million, 32 and 
according to local newspapers, provoked a frenzy of Pro-Americanism. El Tiempo 
proclaimed: “Bogotá welcomed President Kennedy and Jacqueline with open arms and hearts 
beating with sincere affection.”33 These impressionistic accounts of support for Kennedy’s 
policies seemed to be confirmed when the US Information Agency commissioned a survey 
on public opinion towards the Alliance in the hemisphere. In December 1961, the same week 
Kennedy was visiting Colombia, the survey concluded “Bogotá citizens hold views 
exceptionally favourable to the US and the Alliance for Progress”. 82% of those surveyed 
believed the US was sympathetic to “the hopes and wishes” of the people of Colombia.  71% 
of those questioned were aware of the AFP, and two out of three favoured it.34 75% would 
chose the US over Russia in the Cold War struggle.35 The director of the CIA reported to 
President Kennedy that “the trip was an outstanding success and may very well mark a 
turning point in United States relations with Latin America”, since it “was particularly 
                                                 
29Position Paper, ‘The President’s visit to Venezuela and Colombia’, 6 December 1961,. National Security File, 
Box 235, Folder ‘President’s Trip to Venezuela and Colombia 12/61 Briefing Book, Colombia’, John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy Library (JFKL). 
30 Editorial ‘La Alianza para el Progreso’, in El Tiempo, 8 December 1961, p. 4. 
31 Telegraph, Robert Woodward to Embassy in Bogotá, n.d. Folder ‘President’s Trip to Venezuela and Colombia 
12/61- General 11/18/61 –12/9/61’, National Security File, Box 235. JFKL.  
32 Telegraph, Ambassador Fulton Freeman to Secretary of State. 18December, 1961, Folder ‘President’s Trip to 
Venezuela and Colombia 12/61- General 12/16/61 –1/15/61’. National Security File. Box 235.  JFKL. 
33‘Danza de las Horas’ in El Tiempo, 19 December 1961, p. 4.  
34 Memorandum, USIA Director to President. December 8, 1961. Subject, ‘Public Opinion In Bogotá’. Folder 
“Colombia 12/61-3/63”. N.S.F. Box 392. Dungan Papers, JFKL. 
35Report, United States Information Agency. ‘Public Opinion towards the Alliance for Progress in Bogotá and 
other Latin American Cities, December 1961’,  Folder ‘Colombia 12/61-3/63’. N.S.F. Box 392. Dungan Papers, 
JFKL.  
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effective in dramatizing the determination of the United States to carry out the principles of 
the Alliance for Progress”. 36 
 
The initial projects 
The initial AFP efforts in Colombia, geared towards high-visibility housing and school 
building projects, were followed quickly by comprehensive plans for more radical reforms. 
The US blueprint for subsidizing change in Colombia followed closely the Rostow model of 
‘modernization’, in which development possibilities were given by the relative weight of 
oligarchic groups associated with traditional agriculture vs. urban-oriented modernizing 
groups. A State Department ‘Strategic Study for Colombia’ characterized key political 
players in Colombian society as divided between “developers” and “adversaries of 
development”. The first included the land reform agency INCORA, the regional development 
corporations, the staff of the National Planning Department, and the Department of 
Economics at the elite University of the Andes. These groups were identified as the natural 
allies of the AFP and went on to receive substantial aid in the initiative’s first years. Their 
opponents, according to the same US government document, included the Agriculturalists’ 
Society (in which most of the largest landowners were members), the Bankers’ Association, 
the Coffee Federation and some regional merchants’ associations. The report stated that “US 
representatives have access to the Developers and often can influence them. While our 
influence on their counterparts, or adversaries, is more limited, they must not be overlooked 
in our strategy.”37 Therefore, friends and foes of the Alliance should be identified, and the US 
government should “evaluate current programs to see in what measure they strengthen or 
weaken” them. The report considered it necessary to “devise ways of strengthening or 
weakening their position further”. The armed forces, organized labour, students, and the left 
wing MRL party38 were singled out as players on which US attempts to influence them 
“should be pursued with special vigor”. 39 
 
The US implementation of this strategy of strengthening the ‘developers’ and weakening the 
‘adversaries’ had begun in earnest in early 1961. That year the Colombian government under 
Lleras Camargo began preparing itself for AFP money, most notoriously by passing a law 
which created INCORA, the land reform agency, and by producing by December 1961 a ‘Ten 
Year General Plan for Social and Economic Development’.40  The first two project loans 
arrived in August 1961 and characterized well the Kennedy administration’s prioritisation of 
relief for poor urban and rural inhabitants: the first one was a $12 million loan for low cost 
urban housing, the second an $8 million loan for agricultural credit. Also, in December 1961 
the US gave a $3 million grant for construction of primary schools.41 These initial funds were 
followed in 1962 by $22.8 million channelled through the Interamerican Development Bank 
                                                 
36 Memorandum. CIA Director John McCone to President Kennedy, January 5, 1962. Subject; ‘President’s Trip 
to Venezuela’. Folder ‘President’s Trip to Venezuela and Colombia. 12/61- General 12/16/61 –1/15/63’, N.S.F. 
Box 235, JFKL 
37 Report ‘Strategic Study’. 4 April 1963. Folder ‘Colombia draft Strategic Study, 4/4/63’. N.S.F. Box 392. 
Dungan Papers. JFKL. 
38 A dissident National Front faction led by liberal Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, it would eventually rejoin the 
government coalition in the late 1960´s. Its leader was elected president in 1974. 
39 Report '“Strategic Study”. April 4, 1963. Folder “Colombia draft Strategic Study, 4/4/63”. N.S.F. Box 392. 
Dungan Papers. JFKL  
40 Report, Strategy for the AID Program in Colombia” March 17, 1962. Folder “Colombia 12/61-3/63”. N.S.F. 
Box 392. Dungan Papers. JFKL 
41 Alianza para el Progreso, (n.d.), Annex: Cuadro E. 
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for additional social infrastructure programmes, particularly housing through the 
Development Loan Fund.42 
On 17 March 1962, a document termed ‘Strategy of the AID [Agency for International 
Development] program in Colombia’ enumerated the following as their three main priorities 
for the immediate future: in the first place the provision of development planning and 
implementation assistance, “to help Colombians develop projects from their plans, and 
provision of funds for engineering and technical studies”. The second priority would be 
education, “especially training in development skills… and primary school building and 
teacher training” as well as “ a university scholarship program, aid to vocational education, 
and an educational survey conducted as a first step to a revised educational system”. 
Agricultural development was designated as the third priority. 43 
 
The next project loans were approved in 1963 and reflected both the intention of providing 
high visibility social projects, and the strengthening of ‘developer groups’ in Colombian 
society. The National Planning Agency received $2 million for building capacity in project 
evaluation. The urban housing agency got another $7.5 million, while agricultural credit for 
INCORA was assigned $10 million, and a study on mineral resources was given $2 million.44 
Besides the major loans described above, other ‘modernizing’ groups received direct grants 
from the US government, particularly in the educational sector. The Economics Department 
at the University of the Andes, which had been singled out as a focus of pro-American 
thought, was given funds to contract with the University of Minnesota advanced training for 
many of its faculty members and advice in the creation of a graduate economics programme. 
A similar programme was begun between a business school in Medellín and the University of 
Syracuse.45 Colombia was the first country to host Peace Corps members, who in 1963 
started an educational television programme broadcast to public schools across the country. 
AID provided $575,000 to purchase 1,500 television sets distributed to public primary 
schools.46  Two other major US aid initiatives in Colombia were the surplus food or ‘Food for 
Peace’ programme run by the US Department of Agriculture, and the Military Assistance 
Program. During 1962-1963 the Department of Agriculture gave Colombia $35.4 million in 
surplus food, while the Military Assistance Program totalled $6 million in 1962 and $8.4 
million in 1963.47 
 
The first obstacles 
However, since very early in its implementation, the rosy projections built around the 
Alliance were being tempered by criticisms and warnings both in Washington and from Latin 
America. In the case of Colombia, these were coming as early as August 1961, just before the 
Punta del Este meeting. In a private message to Kennedy, President Lleras Camargo warned 
that prospects for this conference were “undermined by considerable scepticism” as “many 
countries think that [the] proposed US resolution lacks precision regarding terms of pledge of 
aid to Latin American countries while at the same time requiring from them in very clear 
form radical transformations that they cannot undertake without the external aid”. 48 On 25 
                                                 
42 ibid. Annex cuadro A. 
43 Report, Strategy for the AID Program in Colombia” 17 March, 1962. Folder ‘Colombia 12/61-3/63’. N.S.F. 
Box 392. Dungan Papers. JFKL. 
44 Alianza para el Progreso, (n.d.), Annex: Cuadro E. 
45 Alianza para el Progreso, (n.d.), Annex:Cuadro C p. 3. 
46 Alianza para el Progreso, (n.d.), p. 37-38. 
47 Alianza para el Progreso, (n.d.), Annex Cuadro A. 
48 Telegram, Ambassador Fulton Freeman to Secretary of State, 4 August, 1961. Folder ‘Colombia General 
1961’.  N.S.F. Box 26. JFKL.  
 9
August, Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon warned President Kennedy that the 
implementation of tax and land reform in Latin American countries “will be an extended 
process requiring continuous representational efforts and negotiations by our field personnel” 
and that extensive retraining and rehiring would be needed among US diplomatic personnel 
to increase “their competence in broad economic and social problems and policies”. 49 
 
A memo written to Kennedy by advisor Bill Haddad on 9 March 1962, warned that “there 
was no criteria established for loans and grants”, countries were being given money without 
previous achievement of reforms and people were asking  “where do political loans stop and 
development loans begin?” He doubted that in the future it would be possible to maintain the 
criteria of loans given in exchange for commitment to tax and land reform, and therefore, 
they were at risk of being attacked for softening their policy. “To avoid this”, he claimed, 
“we must coldly select one country (maybe a banana republic) and crack the whip, loudly and 
publically”.50 
     
Another memo prepared by an unnamed Kennedy staffer, apparently at the same time in 
1962, gave an even harsher verdict on the advance of the Alliance. It claimed that its 
problems included “the political instability of Latin American countries, their inability to 
concentrate on development,” and “…their ingrained cynicism about the US”. Furthermore, 
they “have shown a complete inability to do realistic planning and to deal with development 
problems. They have not come forward with the plans and projects which we want to finance 
with the result that we have a surplus of funds. In addition we have a constant flow of crisis 
requests of the sort we vowed to eliminate. And for political reasons we are forced to spend 
our money for such things such as balance of payments and budgetary support”.  
 
On the US side, the unnamed commentator claimed “we suffered from a tremendous time lag 
in getting our effort organized” and “are still hampered by lack of qualified personnel, by 
unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles and procedures, by staff people who are not equipped to 
do this job and by the fear of congressional criticism”. The memo claimed, “in some 
countries there is not a single man qualified to assist in development work”. Among the 
suggestions for improvement, the memo asked for “at least 28 qualified stenographers”, along 
with other measures such as an American staff which would work along Latin American 
countries to develop project plans since “we know that the Latin American nations do not 
have the capacity to initiate and carry forward a program of development, and so we must 
assist them”.51  In March 1962, the vice-president of the Interamerican Development Bank 
told the president “the lag in Alianza which worries many of us has roots in the inadequacy of 
programs mobilizing public opinion in Latin America”. 52 
  
Field reports from Colombia were mirroring many of these criticisms. In the same month, a 
State Department report claimed that while it was fair “to allow Colombia to retain its rating 
as one of the best, if not the best of the Latin countries in the Alliance on the basis of its self 
help and reform efforts” it was also fair to say that “these efforts so far have had relatively 
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small results”. On the land reform legislation, for example, the report claimed that “it was 
such as to carry no immediate threat to landed interests, especially if implemented by friendly 
hands”. The new national planning technocracy was “weak and relatively undistinguished, 
except for president Lleras” with its administrative staff led “by young people with little 
experience or government-wide prestige”. 53 
 
US concerns about the Alliance in Colombia seriously increased by mid 1962, once Lleras 
Camargo was due to leave the presidency and the National Front faced its first presidential 
election in office with few candidates appearing to match Lleras Camargo’s popularity in US 
government circles. An American envoy to Latin America stated in March 1962 that “[i]n 
Colombia, despite all its progress, the tragedy is that …[advance in the Alliance]…  is largely 
due to the dedication and ability of one man - Alberto Lleras Camargo, its outgoing president. 
When he leaves office this year, prospects for continued advance on the Alliance For 
Progress will decline notably”54. The State Department reported in March 1962 that in the 
first semester of that year the Colombian economic situation was deteriorating. They 
expected a $116 million balance of payments deficit. Moreover, the National Front 
candidates were not very attractive, leading the report to claim that “the prospect is for a 
President who is either weak or controversial”. It added that “President Lleras is keenly 
aware that Alliance for Progress programs tend to help his administration with the voters and 
to discourage attacks on the present National Front system, he is campaigning accordingly”. 
As Colombia’s balance of payments problem worsened, Lleras Camargo contemplated 
implementing a structural adjustment programme centred around a substantial devaluation, 
which probably would generate inflation. The prospect of a sharp cost of living increase just 
before the National Front faced its first electoral challenge since the return of democracy 
created fears of a voter backlash that could play into the hands of political extremists. The 
State Department report recommended quickly giving Lleras Camargo a loan, which would 
temporarily cover the nation’s balance of payments deficit. This would eliminate the need for 
harsh economic adjustment measures and increase the National Front’s electoral chances.55 In 
the same week, the US embassy in Bogotá pointed out that “real danger may arise if 
opposition parties …seize upon …indications of relatively weak US support of Colombia 
under the Alliance to make election capital. Should this appear imminent we may well have 
to consider offering massive aid proposal, …in order to avoid crippling National Front’s 
chances at polls in May”.56 On 11April 1962, just days before the presidential election, the 
US approved its first so-called ‘Program Loan’ to Colombia for $30 million dollars.57 
‘Program Loans’, as opposed to ‘project loans’ were not tied to any particular development or 
social project. Instead, they would simply give the Colombian government enough foreign 
currency to maintain the country’s foreign consumption levels and avoid a traumatic 
devaluation. For the first of many times, the US resorted to employing aid in Colombia to 
solve short-term political problems rather than promoting long-term social reform. Elections 
resulted in a triumph for National Front candidate Guillermo Valencia. On 7 June 1962, 
Kennedy’s Latin American Policy Committee met and produced the following 
recommendation: “that the US make every effort during the first six months of the new 
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Valencia government to support and encourage it. The stability and political power of the 
Valencia government is a vital key to successful prosecution of such Alliance objectives as 
land and tax reform in Colombia”. 58  
 
The US was not always satisfied with Lleras Camargo’s performance under the Alliance. On 
July 23, 1962, in the last few days of his term in office, US ambassador Fulton Freeman 
complained to the leaving president that upon visiting the US-funded housing project in 
Techo, he found that “there was great activity in housing starts, numbering nearly 5000…” 
but was disappointed by the muddy roads, lack of electricity and sewage, and “the fact that 
nothing whatsoever had been done regarding the Escuela Alianza para el progreso which had 
been ‘dedicated’ by Presidents Lleras and Kennedy, and that only a muddy field existed 
where the school was to have been constructed”. 59 Lleras Camargo’s departure would be 
followed by a more critical US appraisal of Colombian efforts under the Alliance.  
 
The Alliance under Valencia  
The beginning of the Valencia government was characterized by his public support for 
Kennedy’s hemispheric initiative. On 4 August, three days before his inauguration, president 
elect Valencia met with Kennedy’s personal envoy Chester Bowles, indicating that “he 
proposed to direct his government towards basic social reforms” but at the same time claimed 
that the main problem faced by the country, even more than the need for social development, 
was “violence, which sapped so much of the country’s energy”. 60 In his inauguration speech, 
Valencia repeated his campaign pledges to support the Alliance and its social programs, as 
well as his friendly attitude to the US.  He emphasized his gratitude for Kennedy’s 1961 visit 
and the more recent arrival of the Peace Corps to Colombia.61 
 
In spite of these initial friendly overtures, US officials who dealt with Valencia frequently 
described his performance in very unfavourable terms. Ambassador Freeman remembered 
Valencia in a 1969 interview as “ a very interesting, personable mediocrity”, ”a hunter of 
animals and women and a lover of alcohol”, and “a charming man who was totally incapable 
of taking over such a high office as President of Colombia”.  Freeman claimed that 
Colombia, after being heralded as a show case for the AFP under Lleras, “failed to actually 
live up to its billing during the period of President Valencia”, who “neither understood nor 
cared very much about what Colombia was doing under the Alliance, except as a political 
tool”. 62 The Colombian presidential succession quickly led US officials to report what they 
saw as a noticeable change in the enthusiasm with which the Colombian government 
undertook the objectives of social reform initially proclaimed by Lleras Camargo. One of 
these reports claimed that “President Lleras’ own ideas on reform and development have 
gone much further than those of most upper class Colombians, few of whom appear to be 
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fully aware of the need for greater self-help efforts in the social field”. 63 A visit by US 
Alliance coordinator Teodoro Moscoso to Bogotá in October 1962 exposed him to some of 
the increasing criticisms being held against the Alliance. In a meeting with student leaders, 
one of them told him “[t]his program has left us in debt and our government is almost 
bankrupt. The interested persons in INCORA will be those who profit and not ‘el pueblo’. In 
spite of all the planning that has been done it did not begin where it should have. Soon 
Colombia will be unable to pay”. To which Moscoso answered: “Some of this may be due to 
the weakness in your own government. The Alliance for Progress is not the cause”. 64 
  
At this point, US authorities had begun to worry about the ‘moral hazard’ situation created 
for Colombian authorities by US insistence on showing them as one of the ‘successful’ 
countries of the hemisphere.65 That same month, the US embassy in Bogotá reported that it 
might not be wise to go ahead with the planned visit of Under Secretary of State George Ball, 
just after Moscoso´s own stopover, because it could lead authorities in Bogotá to “believe 
Colombia [was] of such high importance to us [that] the Government of Colombia need not 
be too concerned with attempts by US and international agencies [to] enforce sound financial 
requirements”. 66 On November 2, adding to the controversy, President Valencia declared to 
the national press that in a trip to Washington earlier in the year, US officials had told him 
Colombia was the “showcase” of the Alliance, to which he now replied that the showcase 
was ready but there was nothing to put on show. 67  
 
On December 18, 1961, the US approved a new $60 million Program Loan for Colombia, 
giving Valencia’s government a balance of payments loan twice as large as had been granted 
to the previous Lleras Camargo administration. 68 However, US perceptions on the mediocrity 
of the new government and the questionable way in which aid was being spent remained 
unchanged. The first year of the Valencia administration was characterized by increasing 
inflation and budget deficits, and dwindling foreign reserves.69 In February 1963, ambassador 
Freeman informed Washington that “it is rapidly becoming clear that this is not to be an easy 
year for the Alliance for Progress in Colombia” as he pointed out that the government’s 
unwillingness to adjust its runaway spending was creating serious economic and political 
problems. He blamed Valencia, adding that “it did not have to be this way” but that the 
“missing critical ingredient has been effective leadership at the top”. Freeman ended his 
report advising that in order to maintain Colombian leadership within the Alliance, it would 
need “fast foreign finance flow”. 70 The US subsequently moved to expand its financial 
assistance to Valencia’s troubled administration. On February 14, the Colombia strategy 
statement prepared by the US AID claimed that “the estimated external support requirement 
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is $220 million annually for the next four years” and added that “the annual US loan level is 
expected to average $100 million in disbursements.”71  
 
Growing frustration with the advance of the Alliance in Colombia, and criticisms on the way 
its government was handling aid, were not limited to US voices. In mid 1963, former 
President Alberto Lleras Camargo, commissioned by the Alliance to write a report on how to 
improve its situation, claimed that a great deal of its problems stemmed from organizational 
failure both in the US and among recipient countries.  “The manner in which the Alliance has 
been administered by the United States is open to criticism, but it must be admitted that the 
countries of Latin America, despite the progress made recently, have made a very poor 
showing of their ability to organize administratively the coordination of the gigantic efforts to 
which they have committed themselves.”72 
   
In spite of its growing problems, by mid-1963 the AFP had achieved a substantial impact on 
the “hearts and minds” of Colombia, according to the results of a second survey carried out 
by the USIA in seven major Latin American countries. Among those nations, Colombia 
showed the highest level of awareness of the Alliance among the general public (81%, 
compared to 31% in Argentina). The percentage of Colombians who would side with the US 
instead of the USSR in the Cold War increased from 75% to 78% between 1961 and late 
1962. 57% of Colombians believed the Alliance benefited its people as a whole, compared 
with 18% in Argentina and 14% in Brazil. 52% of Colombians knew of the Ciudad Techo 
housing development in Bogotá, which had become the most popular project in the entire 
Alliance. 49% thought the AFP would benefit them personally, and 51% believed that if it 
eventually failed, it would be due to Colombian inefficiency, not lack of US will.73 
  
On May 1963, Tom Killefer, executive director of the Interamerican Development Bank, just 
returning from a visit to Bogotá, wrote a cheerful note to president Kennedy. Killefer pointed 
out that in his inspection of the Alliance-funded Techo housing project he had witnessed 
4,000 finished houses with 30,000 people living in them, as well as 9,590 further houses 
under construction to house 70,000 more persons in the following months. As further proof of 
Colombian gratitude to US support, he mentioned tha t “there are reported to be 4 children 
named Jacqueline in the block where the [housing project] dedication took place, and I saw 
one Jacqueline drugstore”. 74 It was simplistic to see this anecdote as strong evidence for the 
Alliance’s success in winning hearts and minds for the US. Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that during its first two years the Alliance seemed to have achieved more popularity in 
Colombia than almost anywhere else in Latin America. However, as elsewhere in the 
continent, the programme’s popularity would decrease in the following years as the problems 
that had become evident in its first years worsened after the Kennedy administration’s 
traumatic end. 
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From reform to stabilisation: US aid under L.B.J. 
The assassination of John F. Kennedy and subsequent accession of Lyndon B. Johnson to 
power has often been portrayed as a turning point in the development of the AFP: the 
moment after which the US government’s devotion to financially supporting social change in 
Latin America was replaced by a more pragmatic desire to shore up pro-US governments and 
prevent political agitation in these nations. The Colombian experience confirms this general 
hypothesis, although many of the trends later associated with L.B.J. had already begun in the 
Kennedy years. After November 1963, the US government continued a change of strategy 
initiated in late 1962: it largely abandoned its effort to produce rapid social change in 
Colombia through the AFP. Instead, it used the AFP as an instrument to shore up the pro-US 
National Front government coalition in order to prevent the electoral victory of a Perón-style 
populist movement under former dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and, to a lesser extent, to 
counteract the emerging threat of the first Colombian communist guerrillas - the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN).  
 
One of the first indications of a reorientation in US policy towards the continent was given by 
the replacement of several key government officials. Many academic accounts have focused 
on the appointment of Tom Mann as the key US official for the region. In December 1963 he 
became Special Assistant to the President for Latin America, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Interamerican Affairs and Coordinator of the AFP, joining under his sole leadership several 
offices previously held by various Kennedy staffers. In December 1963, one of these former 
Kennedy men, Arthur Schlesinger, wrote to the new President warning him that Mann “is not 
only out of touch with the vital forces in contemporary Latin America- the democratic left, 
labor, the students, the youth, the intellectuals- but actively unsympathetic to these forces. 
His association has been in the main with the past of Latin America, not with its future”.75 
The administration’s tone with respect to the Alliance rapidly became apparent in Mann’s 
first public speeches. The first of these was to be given on May 13, 1964 at the American 
University in Washington. In the preceding weeks it touched off a bitter behind-the-scenes 
dispute between Mann and former Kennedy aides still at the White House. In an early draft of 
the speech, Mann claimed he did not share “the despair about change” being voiced in many 
quarters when referring to Latin America.76 He added there was “not enough to indicate that 
further land reform is necessary”. 77 Mann warned that US efforts at quickening social reform 
there could lead to a situation similar to the later stages of the French Revolution, which 
according to him “came to be diverted from its noble purpose and design and converted into 
an instrument of terror and chaos”.78 National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy tried to 
change the tone of his speech arguing “it would not be wise at all to have your first major 
speech praise the middle class, the upper class, the Church and the military with no comment 
upon other forces of strength and virtue”, like labour unions.79 The ideological dispute in the 
top echelons of the administration was relatively brief, with Mann’s hard- line arguments 
prevailing.  
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The new orientation became apparent in US diplomatic representations in Latin America, 
with Colombia providing a clear example. One of its first signs was a clear shift in the way 
the US perceived the political orientation of the Lleras Camargo government and his 
successor after 1962, Guillermo Valencia. As discussed in section 2, Lleras Camargo had 
epitomized for the Kennedy administration the kind of reformist liberal democrat the US 
should associate with, while Valencia was ridiculed as a less capable administrator with little 
interest in social progress. By early 1964, however, an analyst at the US embassy in Bogotá 
was calling Lleras Camargo a “Hamlet figure” for his unwillingness to stamp out the first 
guerrilla groups appearing in the early 1960s, which would eventually form the nucleus of the 
FARC. Valencia, in contrast, was now praised for having made the political decision to 
deploy the army in a major counterinsurgency operation designed by US Green Berets, the 
so-called ‘Plan Laso’, which would lead to the Marquetalia operation of 1964, the first major 
Army operation against the emerging FARC Communist guerrillas.80 
 
The Alliance also saw its focus move steadily from promoting social reform to guaranteeing 
social and political stability, as heralded in Mann’s early speeches. The shift had in fact 
begun in the latter half of the Kennedy administration, at least since mid-1962, when the US 
decided to prop up the sagging National Front regime. However, this change intensified 
during the L.B.J years. Emphasis in US aid changed from funding social investment projects 
such as land reform initiatives or large housing estates, to provide increasingly larger 
‘Program Loans’: balance-of-payments assistance to the government of Colombia in order to 
guarantee macroeconomic stability and keep the National Front in power. As mentioned in 
section 2, the Kennedy administration approved two Program Loans for $30 million and $60 
million in April and December 1962. The L.B.J. government followed suit approving new 
Program Loans for $49 million in July 1964 and $65 million in December 1965. In contrast, 
the largest single social spending programme in those years, the agricultural credit 
programme, amounted to a total of around $18 million for the entire period 1961-1965.81 In 
the words of the Latin America Policy Committee, “if we are able to assist the National Front 
in resolving its present economic problems, US prestige in Colombia…will remain high.”82  
 
By the mid 1960s, the viewpoints and interests of governments in the US and Colombia were 
converging faster than during the previous years when the US had advocated intensive social 
reforms. The L.B.J. and Valencia governments shared a preference for stability and a mistrust 
of the possible effects of radical attempts to solve social problems. US government reports 
now confirmed earlier predictions warning that the National Front government under 
Valencia would not advance on Alliance social reforms.  In early 1965 a CIA report claimed 
that:  
The National Front is an obvious attempt by Colombia’s oligarchy to preserve its 
traditional political dominance. In order to maintain middle and low class support 
for the system - and incidentally to qualify for special treatment under the 
Alliance for Progress- the National Front in 1962 launched an impressive plan for 
accelerated economic expansion and social reform. But largely because of foreign 
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exchange and budgetary strains, the Valencia government was forced to abandon 
the plan during 1963-64.83 
 
According to other US reports, many sectors in Colombian society were equally apathetic to 
social activism of the kind espoused by the Alliance. The embassy in Bogotá reported on 12 
May 1964 that “increased public sector activity under pressure of development efforts, 
particularly social investment, has provoked protests of ´statism´ from private sector.” US 
diplomats now seemed to share these doubts about social investment. The embassy report 
was of the opinion that “concentration on social investment, however defensible, has 
relatively little low multiplier effect in the near term”.84 Social spending had ceased to be a 
priority early in Valencia´s administration, and so had US insistence on directing aid to that 
effort.  
 
Those years saw a growing disenchantment among the Colombian public with the potential 
benefits to come from US economic aid. Instead of the high visibility projects of the early 
years such as the Ciudad Techo housing estate, or the launching of a national land reform 
program, US aid now largely focused on attending to macroeconomic imbalances, with no 
clearly distinguishable impact on the day to day lives of common people. The negative effect 
this would have on public opinion had been foreseen by top Colombian government officials 
since the beginning of the shift to programme lending. Back in October 1962, just as 
Colombia was to receive the $60 million Program Loan to bolster the Valencia 
administration, his finance minister Carlos Sanz de Santamaria asked US officials in a private 
meeting to grant him additional funding besides balance of payments relief, in order to 
finance high visibility social spending projects. Sanz claimed he needed these funds to 
persuade the Colombian populace that US assistance “would go to help people in a difficult 
period…instead of being used exclusively through an unpopular oligarchy in banking 
circles”. 85  The trend in US aid that had begun in mid-1962 with the shift to programme 
lending continued throughout the rest of the Johnson administration. The cumulative effect of 
this change in priorities was clear at the end of Valencia’s government in 1966. Between 
1962 and 1966, US balance of payments aid to Colombia reached nearly $204 million, with 
just $77 million given for social projects between 1961 and 196686. During this period, 
balance of payments Program Loans channelled nearly three times the amount of funding 
directed to the social projects that had been the original raison d´etre of the AFP.  
 
This helps explain why, with US aid to Colombia piling up throughout the decade, popular 
perception of the Alliance was ever more critical. As aid money was diverted towards solving 
balance of payments crises, social reforms promised early in the decade did not materialize. 
By late 1964, the US embassy in Bogotá was reporting that  
…probably [the] average Colombian…[is] asking ´what have you done for me 
lately?´...Possibly he is becoming slightly skeptical about the Alliance For 
Progress, because though appreciative of social overhead projects (which, 
however, are thought relatively few) he considers the AFP has not lived up to 
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broadly publicized promises and he believes economically he has not become 
better off.87  
In December 1965 the leading Colombian newspaper bluntly stated in its editorial page that 
Colombia was the “broken showcase of the Alliance”.88 
 
The failure of Alliance- induced social reform is particularly clear with the land reform 
programme, which had been originally described as the cornerstone of its efforts for Latin 
America. Of the estimated 600,000 Colombian farmer families,89 some 11,000 received land 
titles between 1961 and 1964. However, in most cases this reflected the granting of titles to 
families previously squatting on the land, not resettlement in new land.90 By October 1965, 
only 800 families had been resettled through the US-financed INCORA projects. The US 
government thought failure was not limited to the rural sector. In late 1965, a confidential 
AID report rated Colombia’s performance as “unsatisfactory” in tax reform, government 
efficiency, rural development, and educational reform91. On May 4, 1965, former Colombian 
Finance minister Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, now head of the Interamerican Committee for 
the AFP, declared that “neither the Latin American countries nor the US are prepared to 
execute the Alliance plans called for in the Punta Del Este Charter”, and criticized the 
Colombian government for failing to implement its commitments to an adequate tax reform.92 
 
The US government was aware of the political cost of its new aid strategy. L.B.J.’s Latin 
American Policy Committee warned in 1965 that: “To the extent that we continue to assist a 
National Front government unable to resolve these problems, the US runs the risk of 
tarnishing its image in Colombia”93. When choosing to redirect aid towards propping up the 
National Front, the US was foregoing a policy of supporting high-visibility social projects of 
the kind that had generated great popularity in Colombia for the previous Kennedy 
administration.  
 
The National Front’s ability to extract such levels of financial support from the US, largely 
for its own political gain seem more striking if one takes into account the fact that the United 
States´ own intelligence estimates at the time predicted a relatively low chance of the 
National Front being overthrown by internationally-sponsored Communism. One would 
expect that a strong perceived risk of Communist takeover would have presented Valencia’s 
regime with strong bargaining powers to ask for continued support. However, throughout the 
mid 1960s, State Department and CIA estimates repeatedly dismissed the possibility of the 
incipient Communist guerrillas overthrowing the National Front governments of Valencia. 
An embassy report in 1964 predicted that the emerging FARC guerrilla movement could be 
reduced to “a mere police problem” within one or two years.94 In 1965, State Department 
analysts concluded: “we do not foresee danger of a Communist takeover in Colombia in this 
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period. The extreme left in Colombia is badly fractured, poorly led, and not very popular”.95 
As late as 1967, the CIA reported that “the present level of guerrilla activity does not threaten 
national political stability”.96 
 
Instead, the National Front under President Valencia managed to present itself to the US 
government as the better alternative to a more ambiguous threat, that of the rise of a populist 
strongman modelled after Argentina’s General Peron. It was first and foremost to prevent the 
electoral victory of former dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla’s party that the US showered the 
National Front governments with balance of payments aid, since, if Valencia’s economic 
programme collapsed, “the National Front would lose ground at the March 1966 
congressional elections, probably primarily to the forces of former dictator Rojas Pinilla, and 
would have uncertain prospects in the May 1966 presidential elections”. 97 
  
During the L.B.J. administration the Colombian government received approximately $350 
million in US aid98 in one of the largest foreign assistance programmes run by the US 
anywhere in the world. The US saw itself strongly pressured to provide ever increasing 
amounts of financial aid with a relatively limited ability to impose political or economic 
conditionality on the Colombian government in exchange for the financial support the latter 
received. The following section will present one particular incident, the discussion between 
the US and Colombian governments over the granting of the 1965 Program Loan, as a 
relevant example to show the difficulties encountered in US attempts to impose conditionality 
on its Colombian aid.  
 
The 1965 Program Loan episode 
The government of Guillermo Valencia had been struggling with severe economic and 
political difficulties since his inauguration in August 1962. Low coffee prices resulted in 
serious balance of payments problems. Valencia responded early in his term with a botched 
devaluation that sparked an inflationary surge, which simultaneously decreased the 
effectiveness of devaluation in restoring balance of payments equilibrium, and generated 
wide popular dissatisfaction against the government, now blamed for large increases in the 
cost of living.99 Moreover, Valencia’s political problems had greatly increased since 1964, 
when the mid-term congressional elections had seen the National Front lose ground against 
the opposition led by Rojas Pinilla. Valencia’s ruling coalition was now short of a two-thirds 
congressional majority required by the Colombian constitution in order to approve a bill.100 
By late 1964, the regime’s continued existence was thrown into doubt. US embassy 
dispatches reported how other leading politicians were discussing ways to force Valencia to 
step down from the Presidency in order to appoint a more suitable leader.101 Moreover, as the 
balance of payments crisis worsened, the government faced dim prospects of passing 
legislation, which would allow for measures to alleviate the crisis. The US decided to offer 
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more aid to the Colombian government, proposing a new Program Loan under the AFP 
banner. In return for fresh American funds, it asked that Valencia would accept a new 
devaluation. However, remembering the 1962 fiasco, Valencia refused to consider this. In a 
private meeting with the US ambassador he warned that “before he would lead Colombia into 
such catastrophe, he would with serenity resign”.102 US officials believed Valencia did not 
understand the urgency of taking action on the imminent exchange crisis. In December 1964, 
National Security Advisor Bundy received a sarcastic field report from Bogotá informing him 
that:  
we did not work out any arrangement with Colombia yesterday to help it through 
its exchange crisis. Ambassador Oliver was authorized to make a proposal to 
President Valencia, but Valencia had been ordered to bed by his physician. He 
had been shooting doves the day before…103  
 
Over the next few months, the US and Valencia maintained a tense negotiation over the 
approval of the 1965 Program Loan, which Colombia insisted on being with no strings 
attached. In May, US Embassy officials were again expressing concerns that Colombian 
leaders believed their country was too important for US foreign policy to be allowed to fall, 
and would therefore continue to demand unconditional aid.104 As the crisis escalated, the 
problem was brought to the attention of Lyndon Johnson himself. On 11 June, National 
Security advisor Bundy wrote to him reporting that: 
The Colombian economy is going to pot. Monetary Fund, World Bank and US 
economists recently agreed that what is urgently needed is a Colombian de facto 
devaluation of about 50% We are prepared to support such a devaluation with 
$100 million of assistance. At the end of May, it looked as if President Valencia 
would agree on this step. However, he has since changed his mind because he 
does not think he can survive it politically. We think he can if he does it right. 
Bundy added:  
Valencia would like us to give him money without the de facto devaluation.  We 
don’t want to do this since we feel it would cost us $300 million -$400 million 
and even then, it would only buy us a bit of time vis-a-vis the devalaution (also it 
would make a mockery of the self-help dimension of the AFP. In this regard, we 
would be hard pressed to explain our position to other Latin American countries 
seeking aid).105 
 
On June 23, Colombian Finance minister Hernando Duran Dussan resigned after claiming 
Valencia had backtracked on an earlier promise to accept a devaluation, telling US diplomats 
he could not “work with a man who does not keep his word”. A financial meltdown now 
seemed imminent. 106 
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On the 25th, Bundy received a memo from a State Department staffer summing up the 
problem:  
The Colombian crisis poses a very basic issue for the US: under the Alliance our 
assistance is contingent on meaningful self-help measures. The Colombian 
government is at the moment, unwilling to take such measures but insists that the 
US should provide substantial assistance…to avoid a revolution, or at least, an 
electoral defeat for the National Front in Colombia…Also involved is the 
credibility of AID program lending. The department regards program lending as a 
key to success in a number of countries, - Brazil and Chile for example.  It is 
concerned that this type of lending will be denied by Congress if we provide a 
substantial loan to Colombia essentially for political reasons.107  
 
Two months later, Finance minister Hernan Vallejo, the third person to hold the office in a 
year, negotiated an agreement to devalue on somewhat milder terms to what had originally 
been proposed by the US 108 In exchange, Washington agreed to extend a $65 million 
Program Loan. President Johnson authorized the transaction with a handwritten note to 
Rostow in which he accepted the Colombia loan, “with reluctance, reservation and 
considerable misgivings”. 109 The US was only partially successful in demanding exchange 
rate reforms in return for this stabilisation loan. Moreover, the deal was further diluted when 
Valencia reneged on an earlier promise to maintain a wage freeze after the devaluation 
(crucial to prevent inflationary pressures from neutralizing its positive impact on the balance 
of payments) and instead, granted a large increase to public employees and the military, both 
of them groups with obvious political relevance.110 Moreover, Valencia allowed a special 
favourable exchange rate to be applied on foreign currency gained by coffee growers, another 
politically crucial ally. 111 
 
Negotiations for the 1965 Program Loan demonstrated how the ‘Showcase of the Alliance for 
Progress’ could obtain aid resources from Washington on relatively lenient terms, even if this 
meant backing a president who was considered an inept economic administrator in many US 
government circles and whose policies were expected to fail and require even more US aid in 
the future. The Valencia government succeeded in obtaining balance of payments relief from 
the United States largely because of the need to guarantee a National Front victory in the 
1966 elections. As it turned out, their presidential candidate, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, obtained 
a clear victory in the presidential elections with 70% of the vote, but Rojas Pinilla’s 
nationalist ANAPO party increased its parliamentary representation from 2 to 17 seats in the 
senate and from 27 to 36 in the house. The National Front failed to obtain the required two-
thirds majority in both houses.112 
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The effect of Vietnam on aid 
The incoming Lleras Restrepo administration saw increasing bitterness in US-Colombian 
relations on the subject of aid. Accusations of bureaucratic delay in the United States113 or 
lack of commitment to reform in Colombia, were now complemented by the appearance of a 
new region of the world competing for US attention: Vietnam. As discussed in section 1, 
academic accounts have often described that conflict as one of the causes that derailed the 
Alliance. The Lleras Restrepo administration roughly coincided with the peak of hostilities in 
Southeast Asia, leading many of its members to add this criticism to US policy. In 1967, his 
foreign minister German Zea stated in a public speech:   
At this moment Latin America is affected by the conflict in Vietnam which we 
did not provoke and for whose initiation and expansion we have never been 
consulted but which nevertheless has served as a motive or pretext in order that 
the Congress of the US might reduce the [e]xternal aid of that country to the 
others of the hemisphere.114 
In fact, the ballooning Vietnam expenditure forced deep cuts in aid to Africa and South Asia, 
but caused a smaller dent in the AFP. In November 1967 US AID administrator, William 
Gaud, stated in an internal report that “AID funds have become increasingly scarce as the 
rising Vietnam requirement has been taken out of a fairly constant total appropriation”. 
However, Gaud added, “Competition for funds between Latin America and the rest of the 
world has been largely prevented by a separate budget item for Alliance for Progress”. 115 
Another AID document stated in November 1967 that “the increase in Vietnam-related aid 
total from $200 to $600 million between 1964 and 1966, is largely offset by a reduction in 
commitments to Africa and South Asia.”116 
 
Figure 1 would seem to show that, in spite of very large spending increases for Vietnam, 
Alliance funds actually disbursed (as opposed to appropriations) by AID kept a constant 
upward trend at least until 1967. The picture for Colombia is more complex. As can be seen 
in Figure 2, aid disbursements increased until 1963 and then suffered a strong fall in 1965. 
This can be explained, however, by the protracted discussions over the 1965 Program Loan, 
which meant actual disbursement of those funds occurred in 1966. In that year and in 1967, 
just as aid to Vietnam showed a massive increase, assistance disbursed to Colombia remained 
stable at a level similar to that observed in 1964. In fact, in May 1967 the US signed with 
Lleras Restrepo its largest Colombian Program Loan ever, for $100 million. This would be 
followed in 1968 by yet another $58 million Program Loan and a $15 million agricultural 
sector loan. 117 It is hard to know if US assistance to Colombia would have been larger in the 
absence of the Vietnam conflict, but at least it did not seem to bring about a dramatic fall in 
Alliance resources actually disbursed at the height of the Southeast Asian war.  
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Figure 1 – U.S. Aid to Latin America in comparison to Vietnam (1862-67) 
(Note: Figures show funds actually disbursed as opposed to appropriations. Source LBJL.118) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – U.S. Aid to Vietnam and Colombia (1862-67) 
(Note: Figures show funds actually disbursed as opposed to appropriations. Sources, LBJL and U. S. 
Senate op.cit.119) 
 
By February 1968, at the peak of the Vietnam War, Colombia was the fifth largest recipient 
of US aid in the world120.  It does not seem true, then, that the AFP collapsed in Colombia 
under Lyndon B. Johnson due to the requirements presented by Vietnam. 
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The Lleras Restrepo administration. Aid without conditionality 
Controversy over aid during the Lleras Restrepo was not limited to the question of competing 
claims with Vietnam over US assistance. Colombian resentment over attempts to impose 
political and economic strings on Alliance funds reached a critical point during his 
administration. After the protracted negotiation over the previous 1965 Program Loan, high-
level US officials had been struggling to convince their superiors of the bene fits they would 
obtain from this help. The most obvious was again, electoral victory by a US ally. A state 
department official described the benefits of the 1965 loan to newly appointed national 
security advisor Walt Rostow in the following terms:   
 …most important of all, the resurgence of confidence resulting from the 
succesful stabilization program and a reopening of foreign sources of credit, both 
public and private, was probably of decisive importance in bringing a climate 
conducive to orderly elections and the Lleras ticket´s success in the March and 
May elections, where the survival of the democratic and progressive forces had 
been in doubt.121 
What were the concrete benefits for the US of a National Front electoral victory? A State 
department staffer summed them up in a memo to President Johnson in these terms: 
The FTN victory for us means: improved prospects for more stable, efficient and 
progressive governments in Colombia over the next four years, continued good 
performance on our program loan agreement, continued cooperation with us on 
major international issues.122 
Instead, economic instability continued. The winning candidate, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, 
arrived in office in August 1966 preceded by a strong reputation as an able public 
administrator with particular interest in economic management. However, his skills were not 
enough to prevent yet another round of balance of payments problems occurring less than a 
year after the US had extended the $65 million dollar Program Loan in late 1965. Fiscal 
revenue, exports and foreign reserves began to fall again in the third quarter of 1966, and by 
November, these were enough to cover only one month of imports. Once more, USAID and 
Colombia began negotiating a rescue package, with American advisors calling for yet another 
devaluation. 123 In November 1966 Lleras engaged in a much-publicized controversy with the 
IMF, which was coordinating USA.I.D. and World Bank negotiations in Colombia. The 
dispute centred on the familiar issue devaluation with IMF/AID demanding a large 
devaluation to head off a balance of payments crisis. Lleras publicly criticized the foreign aid 
agencies´ requirements as a breach of Colombian sovereignty and instead, after a dramatic 
televised address to the nation, refused both devaluation and  aid. His arguments against 
conditionality were similar to those espoused by Valencia a year earlier during the 1965 
impasse. In a letter written months later to a State Department official, Lleras Restrepo 
argued that having allowed a massive devaluation “would have had social and political 
consequence [sic] which it was my duty to prevent. It is possible that AID or IMF officials do 
not always weigh the importance of these aspects”. 124 
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Lleras Restrepo’s popular nationalist stance against the IMF made it difficult for local 
political rivals to oppose him, and in the following months he managed to obtain domestic 
consensus and approval of an alternative exchange rate policy based on exchange controls 
and a ‘crawling peg’ devaluation instead of major devaluations. Financial markets believed in 
Lleras Restrepo’s reputation as a strong and capable leader, and the exchange crisis 
temporarily receded.125 Furthermore, he enjoyed great popularity for his ‘standing up’ against 
the IMF126 with little damage done to his relations with the US.  A few months later, in May 
1967, USAID granted his government a new Program Loan of $100 million, the largest yet, 
in spite of his open refusal to follow IMF-AID indications on how to run the Colombian 
economy. This would be followed by a $58 million loan in 1968, the last disbursed by the 
Johnson administration.  
 
The Colombian experience with US economic aid in the mid 1960s showed that the US had 
very little success in imposing the more traditional forms of economic conditionality, such as 
orthodox macroeconomic management on the Colombian government. As mentioned 
previously, the US also expected an implicit conditionality, by which its aid to Colombia 
would be tied to strong political support from Colombia to US foreign policy elsewhere. As 
with economic conditionality, they were less than successful in this area. Since WWII, 
Colombian governments had taken a generally strong pro-US position on most relevant 
foreign policy issues, including a strong condemnation of Axis powers during the War, a 
fairly active role in the creation of the United Nations, and even the deployment of a 
significant contingent of Colombian combat troops on the Allied side during the Korean war. 
However, in the early and mid 1960s, particularly during the governments of Valencia and 
Lleras Restrepo, Colombia refused several times to align itself firmly with US positions in 
international crises, much to the dismay of the latter. In October 1962, during the Missile 
Crisis, recently-elected President Valencia refused to allow a Colombian navy frigate to 
participate in the Cuban blockade, claiming that American media  “took this for granted and 
he could not let his policies be governed by the US press”. 127 In 1964 Valencia rejected 
several formal US petitions asking him for Colombian troops to fight in the Vietnam war, 
claiming economic needs.128 In 1965, during an international conference held in Rio to 
discuss the US invasion of the Dominican Republic, Valencia´s diplomats prepared a motion 
condemning the US position. American officials met with Colombian dignitaries warning that 
these positions could jeopardize future aid.129 Valencia’s successor, Lleras Restrepo, also 
earned criticism from US government representatives for what they perceived as Colombia’s 
ingratitude towards US aid. In 1967 Valencia publicly chastised the US government for 
failing to act in support of international coffee prices and bowing to the demands of 
American housewives for cheap consumer goods instead of helping poor producing nations. 
A few days later, his foreign minister condemned the US for allowing the Vietnam War to 
derail its earlier pledges of aid to Latin America. The embassy in Bogotá reacted by delaying 
a previously scheduled release of US aid, hoping “not to lend confirmation to impression 
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already held by some elements here that best way to make Uncle Sam cough up is [a ]  hard 
kick in the groin”. 130 
 
During L.B.J.’s years his government did not even try to obtain from the Colombian 
government the quid pro quo of social reform initially expected from AFP money. They were 
only partially successful in obtaining macroeconomic adjustment policies. Neither did they 
obtain Colombia’s unconditional support in the international arena, as they had sometimes 
hoped. One could argue, in defence of the US assistance program, that its basic objective in 
the 1960s was to prevent Communist revolutions and keep friendly governments in power. It 
is still hard to prove that without US money Colombia would have suffered a Communist 
takeover, especially when American intelligence reports claimed that Communist guerrilla 
organizations during the 1960s were too incipient to threaten the government. In any event, 
US economic aid was not enough in itself to eradicate these guerrillas, which have survived 
several more decades.  
 
One could also attempt to argue that the AFP served at the very least to bolster the standing 
of the National Front and protect democratic rule in the 1960´s from the threat of populist 
dictators. On this issue, near the end of L.B.J.’s administration, his staff was preparing yet 
another Program Loan to Colombia while confidently assuring themselves that liberal 
democracy and a pro-US regime had been preserved largely thanks to the massive aid 
programme. In February 1968, L.B.J. was advised by Rostow to ask Congress for a further 
$90 million in aid to Colombia for 1969, pointing out that Lleras was   
…one of the brightest spots in our Alliance for Progress effort. He performed 
equally well in the political arena by establishing a working majority in the 
Congress for his reform program and in the security field by clamping down on 
extremists in the university and aggressively pursuing the guerrillas.131  
 
Still, this claim must be qualified by events occurring at the end of the decade. The 
presidential elections of 1970 saw populist General Rojas Pinilla obtain his best result ever, 
coming within a few thousand votes of beating National Front candidate Misael Pastrana in 
the official count.132 The close results led Rojas supporters to claim fraud, an accusation 
which is still a matter of dispute in Colombian historical discussions. And a radical faction of 
his ANAPO movement, claiming disillusion with Colombia’s formal democracy, formed the 
M-19, which would emerge in the following decade as the country’s most notorious urban 
guerrilla group. This would suggest that massive US aid was not enough to prevent 
widespread disenchantment with Colombia’s pro-American political establishment by the end 
of the decade. One final episode, though lying beyond the time frame of this investigation, 
sheds some additional light on some of the negative perceptions generated by US aid in 
Colombia. In 1976, while the Alliance had been formally dismantled, AID continued to 
operate in the country. During that year, Colombia’s secular balance of payments problems 
took a sharp change for the better when harsh weather in Brazil led to a worldwide shortage 
of coffee and generated a massive price hike, and a very large foreign currency windfall for 
Colombia. Months later, President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, perhaps remembering the 
political gains obtained by his predecessor Carlos Lleras from his nationalist posture against 
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international funding agencies, asked the US to suspend its aid programme in Colombia 
arguing that the buoyant external situation did not justify the assistance. As he recalled in a 
recent press interview:  
The economy was then very prosperous. And since the times of (former President 
Misael) Pastrana, US AID, which provided us with a small amount of aid 
resources, had its own desk in the Finance Ministry, with a permanent employee, 
a gringo. He even went to Congressional sessions and sent notes to ministers in 
attendance, telling them what they should answer. It was then we decided to 
reject AID’s help, which was not important…133  
 
  
Plan Colombia: Change or continuity? 
After the winding down of the AFP and president Lopez Michelsen’s row with AID . in the 
mid-1970s, Colombia spent the next quarter of a century without major use of United States 
assistance funds. Thanks to a series of export booms, Colombia faced less of a necessity to 
accept US aid or the strings that came attached to it. While scarcity of foreign reserves in the 
face of low international coffee prices had been one of the great bottlenecks for Colombian 
development in the National Front years (1958-1974) and made American assistance a crucial 
element for economic and political stability, this changed in the following decades. The 
coffee bonanza of 1976 was followed by easy accessibility to internationa l commercial bank 
loans in the late 1970s.134 Colombia faced one last exchange rate scare during the 1982 Latin 
American debt crisis, but still emerged from it faster and with less traumatism than most of 
its neighbours. From 1985 onwards, rising oil production, export diversification and the 
increasing role of illegal drugs in the economy meant that dollar scarcity ceased to be a major 
economic problem for Colombia, and so the need for US funds at concessional rates to pay 
for essential imports fell low in the priorities of Colombian policymakers.  
 
Likewise, Colombia did not occupy a high level in US strategic foreign policy priorities 
during the early 1980s,135 even though the survival of its guerrilla movement provided a 
rationale for continuing US-Colombian military cooperation, albeit at a much lower level 
than that offered to Central American countries such as El Salvador. Colombia embraced 
deep market-oriented reforms and experienced an economic boom in the early 1990s. Its 
economic diplomacy placed a greater emphasis on signing trade agreements with its 
neighbours than on obtaining direct aid.  
 
US-Colombian relations deteriorated sharply after 1994 when US authorities claimed 
President Ernesto Samper had been elected with drug cartel money. During his term in office, 
international isolation coincided with a slowdown of economic growth, an increase in 
guerrilla activity and the widespread belief that the FARC and ELN were now obtaining large 
amounts of funds from drug trafficking. This led to greater anxieties over the Colombian 
government’s capacity to counter the narcotics trade, and brought up worries among US 
policymakers of increased instability in Colombia.136 The 1998 election of the strongly pro-
                                                 
133Lopez Michelsen( 2001:56). 
134 Scheman (1989), p.9.  
135 Michael Shifter, ‘Colombia on the brink’, Foreign Affairs, 78, 4, July/August 1999, p.18. 
136 For a detailed analysis of the impact of drug trafficking on US–Colombian bilateral relations see Arlene 
Tickner, ‘La “guerra contra las drogas”: las relaciones Colombia-EU durante la administración Pastrana’, in 
Plan Colombia: Ensayos críticos. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, Ciencias 
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American candidate Andres Pastrana was accompanied by public expectations of new 
economic support from Washington137 and almost immediately, by the return of controversy 
over the convenience and effectiveness of US aid as a means to increase the nation’s political 
stability. 
 
Origins of Plan Colombia 
As with the AFP, the launching of Plan Colombia responded both to home grown concerns 
and international political pressures. US governments had spent the last decade increasing 
their preoccupation with ways to curb the drug supply from South America and particularly 
from Colombia, calling it a serious national security problem for the US, much as Communist 
expansion had been similarly described in the 1960s.138 However, the initial thrust for Plan 
Colombia seems to have originated domestically. In 8 June 1998, then candidate Andres 
Pastrana first proposed it during a campaign rally. He stated then that:  
[D]rug trafficking, more than a judicial problem, is a social problem…Developed 
countries must help us execute a kind of Marshall Plan for Colombia, that will 
allow us to undertake large investments in the social, agricultural and 
infrastructure field, to offer our peasants different alternatives apart from illicit 
crops.139 
 
Even though Pastrana predictably chose to frame his proposal with reference to the successful 
Marshall Plan instead of the failed AFP, his public discussion of the rationale behind 
international aid for Colombia was quite similar to Kennedy’s. He claimed that social 
injustice was the breeding ground for instability, and that large foreign aid packages oriented 
towards social infrastructure would be a key element of his strategy to bolster political 
stability. Soon after the beginning of his government in August 1998 his administration began 
peace talks with the FARC guerrillas, during which government and rebel envoys discussed 
the latter’s possible role as administrator of a US financed drug eradication campaign by 
which peasants in southern Colombia, an area of intense guerrilla activity, would be paid to 
switch to legal crops.140 During Pastrana’s first state visit to Washington in October 1998, 
president Clinton announced an increase in military aid to Colombia and pledged to mobilize 
US and international support for the peace process. By August 1999, Undersecretary of State 
Thomas Pickering, offered a substantial increase in US aid if Colombia came up with a 
comprehensive anti-drug strategy. 141 The Colombian government responded with an initiative 
dubbed Plan Colombia, unveiled formally in September 1999, which proposed expenditures 
of $7.5 billion. Colombia would contribute with $4 billion and would hope to raise in the next 
months, with international solidarity, the other $3.5 billion.  
 
During the following year the Clinton administration struggled to obtain congressional 
approval for the US contribution to Plan Colombia. President Clinton justified US economic 
support to Colombia in March 2000 with the following words:  
                                                 
137 See Hernando Gomez Buendia in Semana Septiembre 15-Octubre 22. Edición 1105. 
138 Bruce Bagley , ‘US foreign policy and the War on drugs, analysis of policy failure’, Journal of Interamerican 
studies and World Affairs, vol. 30, no. 2-3, 1988, p. 189-212. 
139 Pastrana, ‘Una Política de Paz para el Cambio’, Discurso del Candidato a la Presidencia de la República, 
Bogotá, 8 de junio de 1998, in Hechos de paz: El Presidente habla de Paz. Tomo I. 1998-1999. Bogotá, 2002, 
p.21. 
140 Miguel Herrera Zgaib, ‘Guerra social de media intensidad’, in Plan Colombia: Ensayos críticos, Bogotá: 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 2001, p.303. 
141William M Leogrande & Kenneth Sharpe, ‘Two wars or one? Drugs, guerrillas and Colombia´s New 
Violencia’, World Policy Journal, Fall 2000. pp.1-11 (reprint). 
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...today we are called upon to stand for democracy under attack in Colombia. 
Drug trafficking, civil conflict, economic stagnation, combined everywhere they 
exist, and explosively in Colombia, to feed violence, undercut honest enterprise in 
favour of corruption, and undermine public confidence in democracy. Colombia's 
drug traffickers directly threaten America's security. But first, they threaten 
Colombia's future.  
 
Plan Colombia was defined as a “comprehensive plan to seek peace, fight drugs, build the 
economy, and deepen democracy.” 142 In August 2000, during a visit to Colombia, Clinton 
claimed that the Plan’s objective was to achieve a better life for the people, for which it 
included a ten-fold increase in US support for economic development, governance, judicial 
reform and Human Rights. It also offered human rights training for the Armed Forces and the 
National Police, while denying assistance to any military unit linked with human rights 
abuses.143 
 
During its discussion in Washington, it soon became clear that Plan Colombia’s initial 
emphasis on social investment had changed. Clinton asked the US Congress for $1.6 billion 
in Colombian aid over two years, eventually obtaining authorisation for $1.3 billion. While 
Colombia still pledged to finance most of the social aspects of the Plan through its own 
funds, the vast majority of US resources were approved for military aspects of the anti-drug 
campaign. 144 In November 2000, US Drug Czar Gen. Barry McCaffrey defended this new 
orientation affirming that security was one of the main challenges faced by Colombia, a 
situation which demanded strong military assistance from the US to help the government 
regain legal control over the drug producing regions, particularly in the distant southern 
jungle region, in order to protect Colombian citizens and curtail illegal drugs production.  In 
his description of the Plan, McCaffrey assured that it would work along two strategies. The 
first one would be the eradication of drug production in Southern Colombia, followed by 
village-level programmes to support the local economy’s transition to legal alternatives. 
These programmes included the development of the necessary infrastructure for marketing 
legal crops as well as technical assistance for peasant organisations. On the military 
component of the Plan, McCaffrey assured that their government’s policy was to abstain from 
directly supporting Colombian counterinsurgency efforts, focusing instead on anti-drug 
operations. However, the US would provide support to the Colombian government to protect 
security forces directly related with anti-narcotics efforts.145 
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Continuities and differences 
A line of thought espoused by some academics, including Sarmiento Anzola 146 and Petras147 
among others, claims that Plan Colombia is a continuation and escalation of US 
counterinsurgency policy begun in the 1960s by Kennedy. Evidence presented in this paper 
reveals differences, as well as some continuities. The AFP and Plan Colombia both sought to 
deploy economic aid as a means of furthering US political interests in the region. They parted 
from an initial diagnostic which concluded that poor economic and social conditions in 
Colombia were part of the explanation for violence and constituted an eventual national 
security risk for the US. Both initiatives also experienced substantial transformations in their 
emphasis during their implementation, following shifting political realities in both countries. 
After a couple of years the Alliance de-emphasized social reform and focussed instead on 
shoring up a pro-US regime. Plan Colombia also changed from its initial presentation as a 
Marshall plan destined to finance social expenditures as part of a peace process, to a more 
strictly military and anti-drug strategy. However, there are substantial differences in the scope 
and ambition of the two initiatives.  
 
The most obvious difference between the AFP and the Plan Colombia regards the military 
orientation of the latter. While total US aid in the 1960s contained less than 10% of military 
spending, nearly 70% of US Plan Colombia resources are committed to military 
expenditure.148 This reflects a major difference in the way the US perceived Colombia’s 
problems in the two periods. Under the Alliance’s original premises, Colombia was to receive 
help due to its perceived success in the early phases of modernization and its readiness to 
embark on economic ‘takeoff’. On the contrary, Plan Colombia has been built largely on a 
premise of state failure, resulting from the incapacity of the contemporary Colombian state to 
face alone the pressures of drug trafficking and subversion. Therefore, at least in its first 
years, the Alliance channelled funds to accelerate the social transformation of Colombia into 
an industrialized country. Plan Colombia, in contrast, earmarked most of its funds to finance 
an army build-up that would simply prevent the collapse of the state at the hands of narco-
guerrillas.  
 
Plan Colombia’s social expenditure component also followed a different rationale than the 
Alliance’s. Originally, the latter was designed to bankroll agrarian and tax reforms with the 
intention of radically changing the distribution of economic power, attacking a feudal status 
quo, and creating a modernising and pro-US middle class. One of its main objectives was to 
attack the perceived injustice of privileges among the ruling groups in the country. Plan 
Colombia’s social component has a far more modest objective. Instead of attempting to 
change the core of Colombian society, as the Alliance claimed to do, Plan Colombia’s main 
social objective is to alleviate the situation of a relatively small group in the economic 
periphery of the country: the small farmers dedicated to growing illicit crops in the empty 
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jungles of southern Colombia. This area of the country, with less than 10% of the population, 
is far away from the main urban, industrial, or traditional agricultural production centres. It 
has been occupied by impromptu colonisation, with little or no participation or presence of 
the state. It is in this vacuum of authority where illegal armed actors such as FARC have 
grown particularly strong. 149 
 
In this sense, the more modest social objectives of Plan Colombia may avoid one of the main 
problems facing the AFP: the contradiction between social reform programmes and the 
interests of domestic power groups. The eventual US-funded conversion to licit crops of 
impoverished farmers in the coca growing areas of Caqueta and Putumayo presents little 
threat to the interests of powerful societal groups in mainstream Colombia, while the land 
reform projects of the 1960s certainly did. Instead, the crop substitution projects that make up 
the bulk of Plan Colombia’s economic aid programme would help the Colombian state 
recover its ambiguous control over a disputed area of the country. Other Plan Colombia 
social projects include emergency employment programmes in large cities or programmes to 
increase the efficiency of judicial reform.150 Once again, these are relatively uncontroversial, 
and do not touch the major economic interests of politically influential groups. It seems safe 
to say that their implementation will not be treated with the hostility or apathy that the 
Colombian political establishment reserved for social reform under the Alliance in the 1960s. 
Likewise, Plan Colombia projects like crop substitution and judicial efficiency programs 
seem less likely to attract the kind of controversy in Washington brought about by more 
ambitious (and riskier) social engineering under the Alliance, which eventually led to its 
reorientation in the LBJ years.  
 
The ‘conditionality’ aspect of the Plan has been different and less ambitious than under the 
Alliance’s original design. Explicit cond itionality of Plan Colombia aid was largely limited to 
statutes designed to block aid to military units implicated in human rights abuses. The US 
government under the Clinton administration chose not to exercise this option. Of course 
there is the central expectation that aid will result in less cultivation of illegal drugs in the 
targeted areas of southern Colombia. A report in El Tiempo claims the Plan has supervised 
the substitution of 9,000 hectares in the Putumayo province and 629 in the rest of the country, 
out of an estimated total of 150,000 hectares of illicit crops.151 Presumably a failure in the 
eradication/substitution objectives would eventually lead to curtailment of future aid.  
 
The amount of funds committed under Plan Colombia are significantly smaller in real terms 
than those given under the AFP (see Figure 3 and 4). Even though the Colombian press has 
often claimed Plan Colombia is the largest US aid project ever to have been granted to 
Colombia,152 in fact its non-military component for 1998-2003 is about six times less in real 
terms than the amount of non-military assistance provided to Colombia between 1962 and 
1967. The combined military and non-military components of Plan Colombia are still about 
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half the approximately $3.2 billion (adjusted to constant prices of 2002) worth of aid received 
by Colombia in the 1962-1967 period.153 
 
Clinton’s Plan Colombia reflected an era of diminished expectations on the capacity of the 
US to transform developing societies. A large element of US controversy around Plan 
Colombia has revolved around its possible role as a stepping stone for increased US 
involvement, and a Vietnam-type quagmire. The trauma of US foreign policy failures in the 
developing world during the 1960s, as well as more recent experiences in Bosnia and 
Somalia, had left Americans with little appetite for ‘nation building’.154 While the Alliance 
had hoped to completely transform Colombia into a modern society, the Plan under Clinton 
only expected to keep it from complete collapse. In this sense, it is harder to describe Plan 
Colombia in the late 1990s as a continuation of US counterinsurgency strategy from the 
1960s. 
 
Figure 3. Plan Colombia vs Alliance for Progress (yearly non-military economic aid) 
(Source: Alianza para el Progreso (n.d.) and El Tiempo (1/10/02).) 
 
 
Figure 4. Total non military spending for first five years of A.F.P. and Plan Colombia 
(Source: Alianza para el Progreso (n.d.) and El Tiempo (1/10/02)) 
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Plan Colombia and the Bush administration 
The arrival of the Bush administration, however, has led to expectations of increased and 
deepened involvement in Colombia. On August 31, 2001, President Bush claimed that 
Colombia mattered to the US, as could be seen in the $1.3 billion package assistance given to 
the Pastrana government. To continue and broaden the scope of that assistance, his 
administration proposed: 
a $880 million Andean Regional Initiative that will help address the regional 
problems of instability and poverty, and prevent drug trafficking from moving 
across borders from Colombia to its neighbours, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, 
Venezuela, Brazil and Panama.155  
 
Eleven days later, the terrorist attacks on the US changed its government’s attitude towards 
Colombia in important ways. The press reported widely on US pressure exerted on the 
Colombian government to harden its position against FARC and ELN, officially labelled as 
terrorists by the US government156. Among widespread domestic dissatisfaction and 
increased international pressure, peace talks were cancelled by the Colombian government in 
early 2002. The US government has pledged to continue supporting the new government of 
Alvaro Uribe, voted into office in May 2002 after a campaign focussed on promising strong 
law-and-order measures. One of the most visible signs of this increased support has been the 
decision by the US to remove legal limitations that prohibited funding military hardware to 
be employed directly in counterinsurgency activities (as opposed to drug control 
operations).157 
 
Increasing militancy in the ‘War on Terror’ could bring further changes to US official 
economic aid to Colombia. The American press has lately reported on how the Bush 
administration reversed its previous disdain for ‘nation-building’. The Bush administration 
now says that a commitment to financing large-scale socio-economic reforms in developing 
countries is an important facet of the War against Terror. US policy has gone full circle, 
returning to beliefs last held during the Vietnam conflict, such as the convenience of 
overseeing controlled social revolutions in distant lands to prevent the emergence of anti-
American radicalism. As the New York Times reported on 24 November 2002:  
the idea that rebuilding other nations can be good for America is now taken for 
granted again, spurred by fears of resurgent anarchy in Afghanistan and a 
determination to prove that the war on terrorism can improve life in Iraq and 
elsewhere in the Muslim world.158  
 
In this sense, the degree of future US economic involvement in Colombia may be determined 
by its success in rebuilding Afghanistan and other early scenarios of the global war against 
terror. If the US is successful there in bankrolling substantial social and economic reforms, 
and eventually manages to promote political stability and less hostility towards the West, it 
could be tempted to return to other places like Colombia and try to finish the task it 
abandoned thirty years ago with the failure of the AFP. 
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Conclusions  
Between 1962 and 1968 nearly $550 million in direct US aid reached Colombia. The 
majority of these resources, approximately $350 million reached Colombia during the 
presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, precisely at the time the Alliance programme was 
becoming more unpopular. Throughout the decade, Colombian policymakers took advantage 
of US aid, largely using it to avoid macroeconomic adjustment measures that would have 
compromised their domestic political standing. While receiving those resources, they largely 
disregarded US recommendations on social, economic or political reform originally 
formulated by the Kennedy administration.  
 
Among the reasons behind the failure of the AFP in Colombia was the ‘capture’ of US policy 
towards Colombia by a local government which managed to extract a large amount of 
resources from the US government, at least partially for its own narrow goals, providing 
relatively little public goods and therefore creating a generalized impression of failure for the 
rest of the programme. The argument set forth by Faguet on the tendency of aid programmes 
to be diverted towards consumption by politically important groups, seems to hold for 
Colombia in the 1960s.159  
 
Instead of financing social investment, US aid was largely channelled to maintain the 
consumption levels of politically significant groups in Colombia. As a result of the inflow of 
US aid, the Colombian economy managed to sustain its level of imports and delayed or 
completely avoided alternative adjustment measures such as large devaluations. As predicted 
by Collier and others, the US faced great difficulties in imposing political or economic 
conditionality on the use of its aid by the Colombian government. Instead, once it had 
publicly committed to help the Colombian National Front governments as a showcase for 
democratic reformism, it saw itself compelled to continue and even increase this aid even 
when it had become convinced that the Colombian government had largely reneged on its 
reformist plans. Maintaining the National Front in power became the overriding goal of US 
foreign aid, above the original goal of social reform, even at the cost of leaving unfulfilled 
hopes and discrediting US aid efforts among the Colombian populace. 
 
During the period 1964 to 1966, Colombian and US government interests on aid coincided 
more closely than at any other time in the decade, as the LBJ administration reversed 
previous US insistence on social reforms and focused more strongly on guaranteeing political 
and economic stability for the friendly Valencia regime. US ability to influence Colombian 
policy in the macroeconomic management sphere was limited during Colombian balance of 
payments crises in the early and mid-1960´s, when the government needed US funds most 
urgently. By the early 1970s, as Colombia’s foreign exchange position improved, it was 
better able to completely ignore US demands for aid conditionality. Colombian policymakers 
could even ask US AID to leave the country, as occurred in 1976 during the government of 
Alfonso Lopez Michelsen. 
 
The Colombian experience in the 1960s suggests that it is very difficult to make reform-
inducing foreign aid programmes work if the reform objectives of aid programmes do not 
coincide with the interests of those in power, no matter how generous the financial assistance 
prize offered for cooperation with reform. Policymakers both in donor and recipient countries 
will often act primarily in function of their short-term and self- interested objectives, at the 
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expense of the foreign aid programme’s long-term and public-good objectives. Policymakers 
in donor countries are liable to abandon their sponsorship of reform if it so suits their 
perceived interests. Leaders in recipient countries are also liable to be affected by moral 
hazard issues. Once a powerful patron is publicly committed to help them, they have an 
incentive to renege on promised reforms and to behave more irresponsibly, knowing that the 
donor will often extend additional aid to them to avoid the embarrassment of a supported 
regime’s failure.  
 
Colombia’s new experiment with foreign aid under Plan Colombia is much less a reform-
inducing strategy than the Alliance. In its present version it wants to hold the Colombian state 
together, rather than transforming it. In that sense, its interests are more closely aligned with 
those of existing power structures. If it keeps its rather limited main social policy objective of 
crop substitution in the Colombian economic periphery, it will count on more cooperation 
from the Colombian state than that received by the Alliance’s radical reform programmes. 
 
Elements from both experiences, the Plan Colombia and the Alliance, suggest that foreign aid 
as a means to bolster institutional strength is no complete substitute for domestic political will 
and effort.    
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